The Maltese Falcon, or : my Porsche for a passport! by DZANKIC, Jelena
33© The Author(s) 2018 
R. Bauböck (ed.), Debating Transformations of National Citizenship, 
IMISCOE Research Series, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92719-0_7
The Maltese Falcon, or: my Porsche  
for a Passport!
Jelena Džankić
‘We didn’t exactly believe your story, Miss O’Shaughnessy. We believed 
your 200 dollars. I mean, you paid us more than if you had been telling us 
the truth, and enough more to make it all right.’ These were the words of 
Sam  Spade  played  by  Humphrey  Bogart  in  the  1941  film  ‘The Maltese 
Falcon’. Malta’s recent amendments to the Citizenship Act suggest that for 
the country’s policymakers the amount of € 650,000 is just enough ‘to make 
it all right’ for investors to purchase the Maltese and by extension the 
European Union (EU) citizenship. But is cash-for-passport really ‘all right’, 
and does it affect the value of citizenship?
Magni Berton suggests in his contribution to this Forum that what is 
wrong with the Maltese law is that ordinary naturalisation is too difficult and 
discretionary. Indeed, for most applicants, meeting the criteria for ordinary 
naturalisation takes a long time and a lot of effort. During the years of resi-
dence that the applicants spend in their country of destination they make that 
country the focal point of their lives: they learn its language, its customs and 
establish social links with other citizens living there. Their claim to citizen-
ship of that country is based – following Shachar – on ius nexi. Hence the 
integration of such individuals is of high value for citizenship as a public 
good, as a network of communal contributions and responsibilities, as 
shared love for the country.
Yet, Magni Berton claims that the rich may as well love the destination 
country and that money may merely be an instrument for facilitating their 
access to citizenship. Instead of a ‘human investment’, which would entail 
time, establishment of social links, and acquisition of language skills, the 
wealthy can make a monetary contribution. However, as highlighted in other 
contributions to this debate, the rich usually do not spend much time in their 
destination countries. Rather, as Spiro noted, they mostly use the opportuni-
ties provided to them by virtue of possessing its passport. Now, what is love 
in this context? The one who truly loves is willing to wait and invest time 
and effort. Otherwise, we would not speak about love. Offering money in 
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exchange for practical benefits together with a claim of love sounds rather 
like something else. And that ‘something else’ is simply wrong.
In justifying investor citizenship programmes, Magni Berton further 
compares citizenship with stockholding: ‘individual citizens are like a joint- 
stock company in which fellow-citizens invest’. This reduces the scope of 
citizenship, because the interests of stockholders are determined by the 
share of stocks that they have in the company. In addition to this, stocks are 
tradable – not only from the government to an individual, but also among 
individuals themselves.
It makes more sense if, instead of regarding citizenship as stockholding, 
we compare it to stakeholding, as Bauböck has suggested1. A citizen- 
stakeholder is a person who has a fundamental interest in membership in a 
particular polity (rather than in economic or other benefits for which mem-
bership may be instrumental). We can identify such stakeholder citizens by 
looking at how a person’s interest in autonomy and well-being are structur-
ally linked to the collective autonomy (self-government) and well-being 
(flourishing) of a country. This means that those who have obtained citizen-
ship merely on grounds of investment cannot be stakeholders, because they 
only have an accidental and instrumental interest in citizenship in a state that 
offers them a favourable investment environment.
It is worth mentioning that there are different ways in which countries 
offer citizenship to the rich, which is often overlooked both in the media and 
in academic circles.2 The way in which an investor programme is regulated 
could potentially turn this instrumental interest of the rich in possessing a 
passport of a country into stakeholder citizenship. In her initial contribution 
to this debate, Shachar highlighted the difference between ‘golden resi-
dence’ and ‘investor citizenship’ programmes. While the former require the 
investors to reside in their country of destination for a number of years and 
to undergo a standard naturalisation procedure (including the knowledge of 
language, customs, etc.) before becoming citizens, the latter is an exchange 
of a fixed amount of money and citizenship (most governments do run crim-
inal record and due diligence checks of applicants). There is also a third 
mechanism for turning investors into citizens, which is discretionary 
1 Bauböck, R. (2009), ‘The Rights and Duties of External Citizenship’, 
Citizenship Studies 13 (5): 475-499.
2 Dzankic, J. (2012), ‘The Pros and Cons of Ius Pecuniae: Investor Citizenship 
in Comparative Perspective’, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 
EUDO Citizenship Observatory Working Paper 2012/14, Florence: European 
University Institute, available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/21476
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 naturalisation on grounds of national interest. These provisions exist in 22 
out of the 28 EU Member States. Such discretionary naturalisation is the 
prerogative of the state and it is used only in a few cases annually. In several 
countries, including Austria, discretionary naturalisation has resulted in cor-
ruption and secret deals, which tells us that too much discretion can have 
adverse effects on citizenship.
Even with this in mind, we can find some support for Armstrong’s argu-
ment that investor citizenship programmes are not always wrong. That is, 
well-conceptualised ‘golden residence’ schemes may bring economic ben-
efits  to  the  state  while  also  turning  investors  into  genuine  stakeholders. 
However, such ‘golden residence’ programmes should not be based merely 
on real estate purchase, as recently approved by Spain, and they should 
require more than a compulsory residence of only a few weeks per year as a 
mechanism of eventually qualifying for citizenship, as they do in Portugal. 
The argument here is that neither the possession of real estate nor the lack of 
residence can help the wealthy to establish a true connection with the desti-
nation country. Only ‘golden residence’ programmes that are based on 
multi-annual investment, jobs for citizens of the destination country, and 
compulsory residence for the investor before qualifying for citizenship, as is 
the case in Canada, help the investor to become integrated and interested in 
the well-being of the citizens of her or his adopted country.
By contrast, the program recently passed by the Maltese government is a 
‘pure investor citizenship’ scheme, which differs from programmes in other 
EU countries that have recently adopted various ‘golden residence’ schemes 
(Bulgaria, Hungary, Portugal, Spain). Besides the crisis-struck Cyprus, 
which in May 2013 opened several routes to naturalisation on grounds of 
economic contribution to the state, Malta is the only other European state 
with such a scheme. The programmes in Malta and Cyprus are thus more 
similar to the ones in the Caribbean islands – Saint Kitts and Nevis, the 
Commonwealth of Dominica, and Antigua and Barbuda, all of which oper-
ate ‘investor citizenship’ schemes.
Two things make the Cypriot and Maltese programmes more attractive 
for investors than those of the Caribbean islands. First, in the former cases 
the naturalised investor will be granted visa-free travel to 151 (Cyprus) or 
163 (Malta) states. This is considerably more than they would have by virtue 
of possessing the best-ranked Caribbean passport, that of Saint Kitts and 
Nevis which allows visa-free entry to 131 countries. Second, and more 
importantly, since in the EU the regulation of citizenship is decided by each 
Member State for herself, an individual may now obtain EU citizenship for 
roughly the price of a Porsche 918 Spyder. Hence the investor gains access 
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to all the rights stemming from EU citizenship, including free movement 
and residence within the EU, the right to vote for and stand as a candidate in 
European Parliament and municipal elections, diplomatic protection, etc. 
This raises the question of whether it is proportionate and just that access to 
this array of rights is exchanged for the price of a sports car. Doesn’t this 
dilute the value of citizenship to a tradable commodity, voiding it of the 
sense of rights and duties and undermining citizens’ solidarity? If states sell 
citizenship, what the buyer gets will no longer look like citizenship at all.
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